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In this paper I examine two sets of experimental results about the semantics 
of general terms, by Genone and Lombrozo (2012) and by Nichols, Pinillos 
and Mallon (forthcoming). 
 The results of the two experimental studies allegedly reveal significant 
variations in semantic intuitions among participants as regards the correct 
application of general terms. However, the two sets of authors propose two 
entirely different semantic treatments of general terms in order to explain the 
significance and the impact of those results. Genone and Lombrozo espouse 
a hybrid semantics whereas Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon are inclined towards 
an explanation that appeals to ambiguity. 
 I will cast some doubts on the coherence of a hybrid theory and argue 
in favor of the ambiguity approach. Nevertheless, I will argue that the sort of 
ambiguitiy Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon postulate is easy to incorporate to (and 
is in fact already contemplated by) non-descriptivist approaches to the 




In their 2004 paper  ‘Semantics, cross-cultural style’, Machery, Mallon, 
Nichols and Stich [MMNS], concluded that there are wide variations in 
intuitions as regards how the reference of a proper name is determined. Some 
speakers tend to give descriptivist or internalist answersii when asked who the 
referent of a certain use of a name is, whereas other speakers are more 
inclined to give externalist answers, answers that are in line with the chain of 
communication picture.iii The results of MMNS (2004) were established on the 
basis of probes run in the US and in Hong Kong, using vignettes very similar 
to Saul Kripke’s fictional Gödel case from Naming and Necessity.iv 
 Two aspects of MMNS’ discussion are worth noticing for our purposes 
here. Fist, MMNS were motivated by Richard Nisbett and colleagues’ work on 
a wide variety of cognitive differences between Westerners and East Asians 
(Nisbett, R. E.;  Peng, K.; Choi, I. and Norenzayan A., 2001). MMNS’s probes 
are geared towards testing if there are also such cultural differences in the 
responses to questions about the referential link between a use of a name 
and what that use refers to. On the basis of the results, MMNS conclude that 
there is a tendency towards descriptivism among East Asians and a tendency 
towards the so-called causal-historical picture among Westerners, and they 
suggest that the intuitions that give support to the theory of reference are 
relative to culture. 
 It is not clear that the differences MMNS found are linked to culture 
since as further work suggests, there is also wide intracultural variation in the 
responses to cases like the ones posed by MMNS. In fact some authors 
suggest that the variations can be found even at an individual level, as the 
 3 
same person may be inclined towards different responses in different 
situations.  
 The second aspect to notice is that MMNS focused on the debate 
between classical descriptivism and the so-called causal-historical picture as 
regards proper names. However, both approaches to reference provide also 
different explanations of the connection between general terms (natural and 
artifactual) and the things and samples those terms apply to. Other authors 
(Braisby, N.; Franks, B. and Hampton, J. 1996 and Jylkkä, J; Railo, H. and 
Haukioja, J. 2009) have brought the debate initiated by MMNS to bear on 
general terms.  
 In the past (Marti 2009 and 2012) I have criticized MMNS, and a 
subsequent piece by Machery, Olivola, DeBlanc (2009) that follows a similar 
strategy. In a nutshell, I have argued that the questions asked in the MMNS 
2004 and in the Machery, Olivola and DeBlanc (2009) probes ask the 
participants to express an opinion as regards how the reference of a particular 
use of a name is determined, a question whose answer requires reflection on 
practice, and does not capture what the participants’ practice really is, i.e., 
how they themselves use names.v I still have the same criticism, but for the 
purposes of this paper I will set the concerns mostly aside, to focus on other 
aspects of the debate. My purpose in this paper is to examine two proposals, 
by James Genone and Tania Lombrozo [GL] (2012) and by Shaun Nichols, 
Ángel Pinillos and Ron Mallon [NPM] (forthcoming).vi In their papers GL and 
NPM focus on general terms and away from the cross-cultural issues. Both 
sets of authors set out to test the tendencies towards descriptivism and 
towards the causal-historical picture among the population. They both 
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conclude that there are wide variations among speakers, that those variations 
are intracultural, and that they affect even individuals’ responses depending 
on the situation. However, they differ in their assessment of what kind of 
theory would be supported by their results. Whereas GL favor some sort of 
hybrid theory, one incorporating elements of descriptivism and elements of 
the historical account, NPM defend the virtues of an account according to 
which general terms, or some general terms, are ambiguous: on some 
occasions of use the connection between an utterance of a general term and 
its domain of application follows a descriptivist recipe, whereas on other 
occasions the connection can be traced via a causal-historical chain of 
communication. 
 The discussion of these two proposals will lead to a reflection on the 
differences between the postulation of hybrid theories and the endorsement of 
pervasive ambiguity, as well as to an assessment of the kind of theory that the 
data collected by GL and NPM support.vii 
 
2.- The two studies and their conclusions 
GL (2012) extend MMNS’ (2004) line of inquiry to general terms, both natural 
and artifactual. GL presented participants with stories that are similar to the 
Gödel case exploited by MMNS. In each one of the stories there were slight 
variations depending on the degree of fit of the definite descriptions that two 
different hypothetical speakers associated to a kind term, and depending also 
on the causal-historical connection of the term to the kind. The participants in 
GL’s study were asked whether the two protagonists of the vignette were 
thinking and talking about the same kind under four sets of conditions: (i) 
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different description and same causal origin, (ii) same description and same 
causal origin, (iii) same description and different causal origin, and (iv) 
different description and different causal origin.  
 As expected, cases (ii) and (iv) were unsurprising, but the data 
collected about (i) and (iii) revealed that there is an important split among 
participants. When the description associated with a term by the protagonists 
of the vignette was different but the kind at the end of the chain of 
communication was the same,viii 44% of the participants gave a positive 
answer to the question as to whether the two protagonists in the story were 
thinking and referring to the same kind. When the causal connection of terms 
used by two protagonists in the vignettes led to different kinds but the 
description in their minds was the sameix 53% of the speakers responded 
affirmatively to the question as to whether the two protagonists were thinking 
and referring to the same kind. GL conducted their experiment using terms for 
diseases, minerals, artifacts and legal documents, and their results are 
consistent. On the basis of the data GL also concluded that the split among 
participants was not due to their being unsure about the answer or to lack of 
comprehension. More importantly, GL conducted further probes to determine 
if the divergences could be attributed to the fact that different groups of 
participants had and expressed different intuitions some of them more 
descriptivist, and some of them more in line with the chain of communication 
picture. GL observed that the responses to (i) and (iii) type of questions were 
not correlated, so they concluded that the strategies pursued by participants 
“did not take the form of consistent reliance on a single factor” (2012, 728), 
namely they were not consistent with a purely descriptivist or a purely 
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historical approach. This, according to GL shows that “the findings support the 
hypothesis that reference judgments are a function of both descriptive and 
causal factors” (2012, 728),  that “individuals utilize both descriptive and 
causal information in making judgments about reference, and that mixed 
patterns do not reflect . . . a heterogeneous population with some ‘intuitive 
descriptive theorists’ and some ‘intuitive causal theorists,’ as suggested by 
Machery et al.’s studies” (2012, 731). 
 GL conclude that the account of reference determination should take 
into account that both causal connections and descriptive information figure in 
the explanation of what constitutes the domain of application of a kind term 
and they suggest that a hybrid theory, one that incorporates both causal and 
descriptive elements, may provide the right sort of account. GL mention 
Gareth Evans’ (1985) approach as the kind of hybrid theory that would be 
supported by the data collected, although they also express some doubts that 
the details of Evans’ theory really do fit the data. I discuss below Evans’ 
theory in the context of GL’s arguments, but for the moment it is worth noting 
that GL do not make a specific commitment to a specific theory of reference 
determination. Their claim is just that speakers judgments about reference, in 
particular the judgments about what certain general terms apply to, are 
swayed by both descriptive factors and causal factors, and they advance the 
tentative hypothesis that a theory that combines both kinds of factors may be 
supported by the data, without exploring in their paper the form that such a 
theory might take. The kind of vignettes presented by GL are very similar to 
MMNS’s (2004) and Machery, Olivola and DeBlanc (2009) vignettes. The 
questions that GL ask are questions that require from the participants a 
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reflection on what hypothetical speakers are thinking about or referring about. 
They are, thus, questions that invite theoretical reflection about practice and 
do not collect, in my view, data about practice. So, I would direct to GL the 
same objections I expressed in Marti 2009 and 2012.x  
 The situation is slightly different as regards NPM (forthcoming). NPM 
do not construct fictional stories that test participants’ intuitions as regards 
counterfactual use scenarios; instead, they use real cases in the history of 
science in which experts misdescribed a kind. For instance, in the Middle 
Ages the catoblepas was described as “an animal said to be like a bull but 
with a head so heavy that the animal had to keep its head down at all times. It 
was also thought that the catoblepas had scales on its back.” (NPM, 
forthcoming).xi Of course, Middle Age descriptions of the catoblepas are not 
satisfied by any real animal (it is worth noting that the descriptions of the 
alleged animal also mention that looking into the animal’s eyes would cause 
immediate death).  
 Nevertheless, as NPM note, researchers believe that the introduction 
of the term ‘catoblepas’ was connected to sightings of wildebeest. Some of 
the choices NPM present to their subjects do prompt theoretical reflection. For 
instance, on several occasions participants are asked to judge the truth value 
of ‘”Catoblepas” refers to wildebeest.’ However, other questions are closer, in 
my view, to capturing the participants’ dispositions to use the terms in 
question. For instance, subjects were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with statements such as ‘Catoblepast exist’ or ‘Catoblepas are 
wildebeest.’ 
 8 
 NPM hypothesized that if participants in their experiment were primed 
to stress the continuity of application of a term in spite of the presence of 
radical misinformation, by reading, for instance, about the story of the 
continued use of ‘triceratops’ in spite of the extreme original 
mischaracterizations of the dinosaur, they would make choices in line with the 
causal-historical picture, whereas subjects exposed to a story that heavily 
highlighted the radically erroneous nature of the characterization of the 
catoblepas (for instance, the inclusion of the statement that looking into a 
catoblepas’ eyes would cause immediate death) would be more inclined to 
respond in ways more sensitive to the fact that the descriptive information 
associated with ‘catoblepas’ is not satisfied by any existing kind. By and large, 
the results support NPM’s hypothesis. 
 The choice of the catoblepas story is, in my view, unfortunate. The 
description of the catoblepas, in particular the attribution of the property of 
causing death with its sight, makes it almost a mythical character. And in such 
cases, the fact that some rather unspecified alleged connection to some real 
animal, the wildebeest in this case, figures in the story may not be sufficient to 
push speakers to accept that the word does indeed refer to those real 
animals. Kripke has pointed out that  “. . . if the story of the unicorns were 
historically connected to some genuine and ordinary kind of animal . . ., and 
the mythical traits attributed to it gradually evolved, we would probably not say 
that it turned out that unicorns really existed after all.” (Kripke 2013, 50, fn 18). 
Thus, the observed tendency NPM observe among speakers to deny that the 
catoblepas existed when the erroneous nature of the Middle Age experts 
description was highlighted, may not be driven by descriptivism, but simply by 
 9 
the presumption that ‘catoblepas’ refers to a mythical animal. Nevertheless, 
although I will refrain here from discussing the details, some of the speakers’ 
reactions reported by NMP are indeed surprisingxii and they reveal variations 
among speakers’ reactions, even if it is not entirely clear what the cause of 
the variations is.  
If we concede that NPM’s hypothesis is corroborated, the interesting 
point for our purposes is that NPM’s results appear to be approximately in line 
with GL’s. Nevertheless, NPM put forward a different conclusion as regards 
the semantic explanation that supports the data. Instead of endorsing a 
unified hybrid theory of reference, NPM suggest that kind terms are 
ambiguous between a descriptivist and a causal-historical reading. Depending 
on the conversational setting, speakers will be inclined either towards 
responses consistent with a descriptivist disambiguation or towards 
responses consistent with a causal-historical approach.  
 NPM argue that a hybrid theory would not account for the data 
presented, and their target in such argument is the kind of theory suggested in 
Evans 1985. So, both in GL’s and in NPM’s case the discussion revolves 
around the adequacy of a hybrid theory like Evans’. Before assessing GL’s 
and NPM’s recommendations it is worth stopping to reflect on the nature of 
Evans’ proposal and the sense in which it can be considered to be a hybrid 
approach. 
 
3.- Hybridity and Evans’s approach  
Right off the bat, it is hard to see what a unified theory that incorporated 
elements of classical descriptivism –the kind of descriptivism Kripke, 
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Donnellan and others were arguing against, which happens to be also the sort 
of descriptivism GL, NPM, as well as MMNS focus on—, together with 
elements of the causal-historical approach would consist in.  
 This is not because the causal-historical approach is an alternative to a 
theory of the determination of reference such as classical descriptivism. The 
chain of communication picture, or causal-historical picture is not a theory of 
the determination of reference. What makes a use of ‘Aristotle’ refer to 
Aristotle is not the fact that the use is connected to previous uses of the word, 
since that connection at most will lead to the first use of the name, not to the 
referent.xiii The picture presented by Kripke (1970) and Donnellan is rather an 
intuitive explanation of the transmission of names –of words, in general, and 
the preservation of their semantic function.xiv 
 As an aside, let me point out that it is unfortunate that the chain of 
communication picture continues to be presented as a theory of determination 
of reference; and experimental philosophers, although not the origin of the 
confusion, are contributing to it. 
 In fact, a classical descriptivist could incorporate the causal-historical 
chain into their approach. All a descriptivist would need to argue is that names 
are bestowed by being linked to definite descriptions which are then passed 
from user to user, from link to link of a chain of communication. From this 
point of view, what makes a speaker a new link in the chain of communication 
would be the acquisition of the definite description associated with the name, 
a definite description that determines the reference of each use of the name. 
Of course, a theory of this sort would be a descriptivist theory thru and thru 
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and not the kind of theory contemplated by GL, NMP and Machery and 
colleagues.  
 What makes classical descriptivism and any approach to reference 
consistent with Kripke’s approach so difficult to combine in a hybrid theory is 
precisely the fact that Kripke’s argument is essentially a negative argument. 
What emerges from Kripke’s considerations, and in particular from the crucial 
semantic arguments –the ignorance and error arguments— is that reference 
does not have to be established via the satisfaction of descriptive information. 
And this amounts to the denial of classical descriptivism.xv An approach to 
reference that is, arguably, hybrid is the sort of causal descriptivism proposed 
by Frederick Kroon (1987) a view according to which reference is determined 
by a description such as ‘the individual at the end of the chain that leads to 
this use of N,’ or ‘the person that the members of my community from which I 
inherit my use of N refer to,’ or something similar. This could count as a hybrid 
view, since it claims that reference is determined by the satisfaction of a 
definite description a speaker associates with N, as classical descriptivism 
urged, while at the same time incorporating the chain of communication into 
the descriptive content. But this is not the kind of theory that the data collected 
by GL, nor by NPM, appear to underwrite, since the descriptive information 
used in the vignettes does not include mention of the chain of communication 
and it is closer to the type of descriptive information contemplated by classical 
descriptivists such as Bertrand Russell. 
 Both GL and NPM take issue with the approach endorsed in Evans 
1987, characterizing it as a sort of hybrid theory. But it is not clear at all that 
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Evans defends a hybrid of the classical descriptivist approach tested by GL 
and NPM and the chain of communication picture.  
 It is, to begin with, doubtful that Evans would incorporate elements of 
classical descriptivism as reference determiners, or partial determiners. For 
one of the features of Evans positive view is precisely that reference is not 
determined by the satisfaction of descriptive information and that it is a 
mistake to interpret Fregean senses as descriptive and as determiners of 
reference by fit. According to Evans, “there is absolutely nothing in the texts to 
support the claim that he [Frege] held that the way of thinking of any object 
must exploit the subject’s knowledge of some description uniquely true of it.” 
(Evans 1982, 18).  
 Evans’ view is often characterized as a hybrid theory. Thus, for 
instance, according to M. Reimer (2010): 
Evans provides several examples of uses of proper names that are 
most naturally accounted for via a hybrid theory . . . Like description 
accounts, [Evans’ approach] accounts for cognitive significance . . . as 
well as reference; like causal accounts, it preserves the intuition that 
one cannot refer to something with which one has no causal link 
whatsoever. 
And Evans himself argues that the approach he proposes in some sense 
vindicates both descriptivism and the causal-historical picture, but it is far from 
clear that the approach he endorses can be characterized as a hybrid, or as 
providing support for classical descriptivism.xvi  
For Evans’ vindication of descriptivism does not afford definite descriptions a 
role in fixing the reference: even in the midst of his avowals of vindication 
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Evans insists that “the fix is by causal origin and not by fit” (1987, 23). As GL 
put it: 
Evans . . . proposed that each use of a name is associated with a file of 
information that an individual stores about the referent of the name. 
While some of the information in the file can be false (by not being 
generated by the appropriate source), reference will be tied to 
whatever is the dominant causal source of the information in the file. 
GL, 2012: 720) 
Descriptive information plays an undeniably important cognitive role in 
Evans’s approach. But this is something that neither Kripke nor Donnellan, 
nor even a true causal theorist of reference such as Devitt need deny.  
 As a theory of reference determination, Evans’ theory is fundamentally 
causal, for the referent of a name is the causal origin of the descriptive 
information that speakers have in their minds. The information might be 
erroneous. The information that Aristotle was born in Stagira or that he tutored 
Alexander the Great may well be mistaken, even if Aristotle himself is the 
source of that information. So, as Reimer (2010) puts it: “Evans' theory avoids 
the problem of ignorance and error.” But this is precisely because the 
description plays no role in determining the reference. The descriptive 
information associated with a name can be erroneous, and this is immaterial 
for Evans precisely because, contra classical descriptivism, the associated 
attributes do not determine reference. If there is massive error in the 
descriptive information associated with a name, we may of course conclude 
that the name does not refer or that a kind term does not apply to anything. 
But this conclusion would not, according to Evans, be based on the fact that 
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no object  satisfied the descriptive information; it would simply be because the 
massive error would be taken as an indication that nothing could plausibly be 
the source of such radically wrong information. So, for example, the claim that 
experts believed catoblepas to cause instant death to those who looked into 
their eyes makes it very doubtful that any real animal could be the source of 
such a wild attribution. 
 Evans’ theory is, in a sense, more causal than Kripke’s and 
Donnellan’s picture for it gives more of an explanation of the causal elements 
at work, something that Kripke and Donnellan do not do. In fact, there is little 
in Kripke’s and Donnellan’s remarks about the chain of communication that 
justify calling the theory ‘causal’. Kripke himself stresses the social character 
of the picture (the fact that what we refer to depends not on what is in our 
minds but on our connections to other members of our speakers’ community), 
over and above the causal factors, and he as often uses ‘causal chain’ (1980, 
93 and 96) as “causal’ chain of communication’ (1980, 59, note 22, with 
quotes around ‘causal’), ‘historical chain’ (1980, 8, note 9), and ‘chain of 
communication’ (pp. 91-3). 
 Some of the cases that Evans discusses are meant to highlight the 
differences between his approach and a naive chain of communication picture 
inspired by Kripke and Donnellan’s remarks. Among those the ‘Madagascar’ 
and the ‘Ibn Kahn’ case stand out. In these two cases, the naive picture 
presented by Kripke and Donnellan appears to give the wrong results as to 
what uses of those names refer to: a portion of the mainland and not the 
island, in the case of ‘Madagascar’, and the scribe who out his name in the 
document, not the mathematician that did the proof, in the case of ‘Ibn Kahn’. 
 15 
Part of the reason to suppose that the picture presented by Kripke and 
Donnellan gives the wrong results, is precisely the fact that the picture they 
present is so under described. Kripke and Donnellan describe a very 
simplified and idealized picture of how names are bestowed and how their use 
is transmitted from speaker to speaker. The dubbing ceremony that is 
supposed to account for a name bestowal is acknowledged to be just a 
portrayal of a typical way in which names get tied to their bearers, but it is 
clearly not essential to the picture. There are other ways in which names are 
introduced: by description, for instance, or by a direct use without the 
mediation of a meta-linguistic ceremony. The picture is flexible enough to 
allow for the bestowal of a name in the kinds of circumstances that are 
contemplated in the ‘Madagascar’ and the ‘Ibn Kahn’ case. Speakers may, 
simply by mistake, start using a name with the intention to speak about a 
certain object and the practice may catch on. As Michael Devitt has 
suggested, a mistake can function as the initiation of a chain of 
communication, by grounding reference in a new object, even when the 
intention to dub is absent (Devitt 1981. See also Devitt and Sterelny 1999). 
According to Evans in such cases uses of the name refer to the causal origin 
of an attributive file, and one may disagree with his explanation, pointing 
rather, for instance, to the existence of a systematic practice that connects 
use to use even in the absence of a common file. But no matter what, and 
even if we accept Evans’ account, the point is that the role of the file is not to 
determine the reference by searching and finding an object that satisfies the, 
or most of the, attributes associated, as classical descriptivism would have it. 
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 Thus, it is not surprising that Evans’ approach would not be a good 
match for the kind of data GL or NPM collect, as GL themselves acknowledge 
(GL 2012, 733) for the data appear to point towards the reliance, on occasion, 




4.- Ambiguity and the causal-historical approach 
As far as I can tell both sets of data –supposing them to portray actual 
speakers’ use, reveal that individual speakers are in some occasions inclined 
to produce judgments that are in line with classical descriptivism whereas in 
some other occasions their judgments give prominence to the continuity of 
reference and reliance on previous uses that is highlighted by the chain of 
communication picture. Rather than suggesting a unified theory of reference 
that combines in each use some descriptivist and some causal elements, the 
explanation of speakers’ responses suggests, in my view, the kind of 
approach NPM endorse, a form of ambiguity according to which in some 
cases the descriptive information associated with a term is dominant in 
determining what the term applies to, whereas in some other occasions the 
chain that leads back to the introduction of the term takes precedence. 
 The kind of ambiguity postulated by NPM is different, as they 
themselves point out, from typical cases of lexical ambiguity. But, if NPM are 
right, the data point towards different uses of terms on different occasions. In 
spite of the differences with other cases of lexical ambiguity, it would not be 
entirely surprising if, on occasion, the file of information that a speaker 
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associates to a term was taken to be that which determines what she is 
speaking about, for after all the file does play a cognitive role, and it is a file of 
things we think we know about the things we refer to. It is not unnatural to 
think that the information we possess applies to whatever it is that we are 
talking about. Whether this should be treated as a semantic or as a pragmatic 
phenomenon is a different issue, and it is not one that NPM have addressed, 
but it is something that needs to be elucidated, perhaps by designing tests 
that can provide evidence on this regard. 
 There is, certainly, a long-standing tradition in semantics that 
recommends resisting the postulation of ambiguities, springing from the 
presumption that a unified theory is in general preferable to the endorsement 
of different explanations. Nevertheless, the resistance is to be taken as a 
recommendation and in fact, the possibility that in certain conversational 
settings different factors, causal or descriptive, may take prominence is not 
far-fetched.xvii  For instance, in cases where the descriptive information 
associated with a term is wildly implausible or off the mark the judgment of 
non-existence is entirely natural, and in fact there are plenty of historical 
examples: we say that there is no phlogiston, not that phlogiston turned out to 
be O2 and that we were wrong in, for instance, attributing to it negative 
mass.xviii  
 An important question is what those variations show as regards 
semantic theory. NPM, for instance, argue that their results “put pressure on a 
univocal theory of reference along the lines of the causal-historical theory” 
(NPM, forthcoming). And the impetus for the debate around experimental 
semantics comes from MMNS (2004) who viewed their results as a threat to a 
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universal of a theory of reference, specifically the kind of anti-descriptivist 
theory endorsed by Kripke.  
 Experimental semanticists argue against the adequacy of Kripke’s 
approach to reference on the basis of arguments about the apparent 
descriptivist semantics of some terms. The assumption, I believe is that an 
argument to the effect that a set of terms have a descriptivist semantics, or 
that some uses of terms follow a descriptivist mode of reference 
determination, constitutes an objection to Kripke’s stance. It is worth reflecting 
on the structure of the dialectic, for it seems to me that there are deep 
confusions underlying the debate. 
 First of all, it is important to distinguish between intuitions about how 
reference is determined from data that is meant to collect actual usage. I have 
already argued (Marti 2009 and 2012) that the former are not relevant to 
semantic theorizing. So, I am focusing here on results that can plausibly be 
interpreted as reflecting usage, such as NPM’s, and the issue to elucidate is 
whether the results and observations constitute counterexamples to the chain 
of communication picture. In order to see that they do not, it is important to 
remember the crux of the disagreement between classical descriptivism and 
the chain of communication picture. According to classical descriptivism 
reference is mediated, always mediated. From this perspective it is impossible 
to establish reference unless it is via descriptive material. Kripke’s arguments 
open the door to a view according to which reference is established directly, 
by convention and without the mediation of definite descriptions, a view 
according to which the conditions of correct application of a term, be a 
singular or a general term, are to be found outside of the speakers’ minds. 
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The kind of semantics that emerges from Kripke and Donnellan, and from 
Putnam’s considerations about natural kind terms (Putnam 1973) 
contemplates direct reference. Their cases and examples are meant to show 
that reference can be direct, that it does not have to be established via a 
definite description, and this is accompanied of arguments directed to 
showing that proper names, in general, and natural kind terms, in general, do 
refer without the mediation of definite descriptions. To argue that the use of 
some terms is arguably guided by an associated definite description, is not to 
disprove the Kripke-Donnellan-Putnam approach, whereas showing that some 
terms refer or apply without the mediation of semantic mechanisms such as 
descriptions, does disproof descriptivism. It is not, and it should not be, part of 
the Kripke-Donnellan-Putnam approach to show that no term can have its 
reference or domain of application determined by associated descriptive 
material. 
 Nothing, as Kripke himself noted, prevents speakers from introducing a 
term and deciding to use it as a real abbreviation of a definite description. Of 
course, whenever a non-structured, tag-like term is introduced in a language, 
the potential for the associated reference-fixing description to stop operating 
is there. Speakers often do not pass along the chain of communication the 
descriptions that are supposed to determine reference, erroneous information 
is easily added to the original reference fixing attributes and uniquely 
identifying properties may be lost, giving rise to ignorance and error and 
leaving speakers with a file whose role is undoubtedly cognitive, but non-
operational at the level of fixing reference, even though the chain that 
connects use to use and leads back to the introduction of the term is still 
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present and guarantees the appropriate connections that keep usage uniform. 
Name-like expressions have a tendency to be used as standard proper 
names. 
 None of this is a threat to the chain of communication, or causal-
historical picture.  
 Of course, according to NPM, their results point in the direction of 
something stronger: it is not just that some terms are semantically connected 
with definite descriptions. Their point is that individual speakers do use terms 
descriptively and non-descriptively depending on the conversation setting. But 
even that is no threat to the chain of communication view. In fact, it is 
something that has been pointed out by one of the staunchest defenders of a 
causal theory of reference. Michael Devitt (1981,157-60) has often pointed out 
that proper names are used descriptively in some contexts. Literary historians, 
for instance, use ‘Shakespeare’, bypassing anti-Stratfordians concerns, to talk 
about whoever wrote the famous plays, when their focus is the discussion of 
the plays and their contents 
the names of authors  . . . can have a double life. In claims about 
where “Shakespeare” lived, was educated, and so on, the name seems 
to function as a designational name. In critical assessments of “the 
works of Shakespeare”, however, it often seems to function as a 
descriptive name, so that it would not matter to the truth of these 
assessments if the work was actually written by Bacon. 
(Devitt forthcoming 2015) 
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 Again, that names, or other expressions, can be used in a way that gives 
prominence to associated descriptive information in the determination of 
reference is no threat to the anti-descriptivist arguments by Kripke, Donnellan 
and others. 
 It is tempting here to engage in an argument as regards how extended 
the Kripkean uses, vs. the descriptivist uses are, as if the statistical 
distribution of different uses was relevant in order to establish one theory over 
another. In my view, arguing in these terms amounts to misunderstanding the 
dialectic of the Kripke-Donnellan stance against descriptivism. Kripke and 
Donnellan are arguing against a conception of reference according to which 
reference has to be mediated; the reference of an expression has to be 
established via an associated mechanism, a description that determines the 
reference on each occasion of use. The gist of Donnellan’s and Kripke’s 
arguments is that this is not so, and that speakers refer in the absence of 
such mechanism. Theirs is issue of contention is a about the possibility of 
reference: the descriptivist claims it is not possible to refer without the 
mediation of a description; Donnellan and Kripke’s arguments and the 
examples they use to illustrate them are meant to show that it is, and it is also 
worth noticing, that the examples used by anti-descriptivists to make their 
case, cover a pretty substantial number of expressions and kinds of 
expressions. 
 If NPM are right, individual speakers, in certain conversational 
contexts, use terms to refer to whatever fits an associated descriptive file. 
This should not provoke changes in the chain of communication approach, 
although certainly would be interesting to continue to investigate what kinds of 
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conversational contexts prompt one or another usage and whether the 
phenomenon is really a semantic phenomenon or a purely pragmatic one. 
 
 
                                            
i I am grateful to Angel Pinillos for comments on a previous version. The 
research for this paper has been partly funded by the Spanish MICINN, under 
grants 2011-2014 FFI25626. I acknowledge also the support of the AGAUR of 
the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR 2009-1077). 
ii Internalist because who the referent of a use of a name is, is determined by 
a description that the speaker has in mind and associates with the name. 
iii Externalist because what the use of the name refers to depends on the 
objective position of the speaker in a network of users. 
iv See Kripke 1980, 83-84. 
v See Devitt (2011) for similar concerns. 
vi Pinillos’ paper in this volume discusses and develops the view further. 
vii Two clarifications: (i) the concerns I expressed about MMNS’s work apply 
also to some of the probes conducted by GL and NMP. More on this below, 
although for the purposes of the discussion here I will be setting these issues 
aside and I will proceed on the assumption that the data collected provides 
evidence about the use of terms by speakers. (ii) a recent discussion on 
hybrid theories of concepts is related to the issues discussed here (see 
Machery and Seppälä 2009/2010). Nevertheless, in this essay I concentrate 
exclusively on semantic issues. 
viii For instance, when one of the speakers (an expert) associates with ‘tyleritis’ 
the descriptive information ‘disease that affects muscles’ whereas the other  
associates ‘disease that affects the joints’ to a disease that is at the end of a 
chain that ends with the introduction of the term for the disease that affects 
muscles.  
ix For instance, in a story about Alex and Bob, speakers in two different 
communities that use the word ‘tyleritis’, a term that in each community is 
historically connected with the dubbing of two different diseases 
x GL acknowledge this (GL 2012, 735), and for the purposes of the discussion 
in the present paper it should play no role in the argument. 
xi I am told that in Greek ‘cato’ means ‘down’ and ‘blepas’ means ‘looking’. 
xii For instance participants do not react consistently to the pair of sentences  
‘Catoblepas are wildebeest’ and ‘Wildebeest are catoblepas.’ See NPM (ms) 
for discussion.  
xiii What positive story of how reference is established is compatible or 
suggested by Kripke and Donnellan’s arguments is an important issue but not 
one we need to discuss in this paper. See Marti (forthcoming 2015) for 
discussion. 
xiv It was Michael Devitt (1974 and 1981) who developed Kripke’s and 
Donnellan’s picture and turned it into a causal theory of the determination of 
reference. But there are many people who accept the picture without 
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accepting the details of Devitt’s approach (as far as I can tell, Kripke and 
Donnellan among them).  
xv In any case, what makes the two approaches difficult to combine, is not the 
fact that they are two incompatible theories of the determination of reference 
xvi Evans himself does not characterize his approach as a hybrid theory. 
xvii  And, as we will see, it has in fact been contemplated even by staunch 
defenders of the chain of communication picture 
xviii  It is hard to determine though whether this is because nothing fits the 
associated attributes or rather, as Evans would have it, we conclude that 
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